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The Effect of Federal Tax Liens on the
Cash Value of Life Insurance Policies
The Government has sought by various means to en-
force its tax liens against the contractual property rights
in life insurance policies owned by delinquent taxpayers.
The normal but expensive and time-consuming method
of foreclosure has resulted in the diminution in value
of the lien through the application of the cash value to
various benefits under the policy prior to collection by
the Government. However the courts have refused to
allow summary recovery by levy upon the cash value
in the hands of the insurer. The author of this Note
discusses the remedies currently used by the Govern-
ment to reach cash value and the obligations of in-
surers to protect the value of the Government's liens.
He concludes by discussing proposals for affording the
Government better protection, without prejudicing the
interests of insureds and their beneficiaries in the in-
surance feature of the policies or imposing undue bur-
dens upon insurers.
INTRODUCTION
A lien in favor of the United States automatically attaches
to all property of any person who neglects or refuses to pay any
federal tax after demand.' This tax lien is general in nature and
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321 provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the
same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional
amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any
costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of
the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether
real or personal, belonging to such person.
See generally Anderson, Federal Tax Liens- Their Nature and Priority, 41
CALa. L. Rav. 241 (1958); Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems
(pts. 1-2), 18 TAx L. REv. 247, 459 (1957); Wolson, Federal Tax Liens-A
Study in Confusion and Confiscation, (pts. 1-2) 65 Com. L.J. 75, 183 (1960),
43 MARQ. L. REV. 180 (1959); Note, 77 HIARv. L. REv. 1485 (1964).
Some legal commentators have been highly critical of the tax lien, while
others have discussed it with approval. Compare Friesen, Collection of Federal
Taxes Out of the Taxpayer's Property: A Judicial Shell Game, 9 K"x. L.
REv. 263 (1961), and Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Govern-
ment: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L. J.
905 (1954), with Cohen, Federal Tax Liens, 85 PA. B.A.Q. 378 .(1964).
applies to all of the taxpayer's property and rights to property -
tangible and intangible? It is a continuing lien in that it also
attaches to property or rights to property acquired by the tax-
payer subsequent to his default and to increments in the value
of property held by him when the lien arises Although the value
of a lien may be reduced or lost through destruction or dissipa-
tion of the property subject to it,4 it is not defeated by a change
in the form of the property. The attachment of a lien merely
establishes a governmental interest in the taxpayer's property.
Thereafter, the Government must move under appropriate
statute to collect the delinquent taxes from the property subject
to it.
The lien attaches to a delinquent taxpayer's contractual prop-
erty rights in life insurance policies owned by him." In United
States v. Bess,7 the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer's right
to receive the cash value was "property or rights to property"
and thus subject to the tax lien. However, the owner of a typical
life insurance policy possesses certain rights the exercise of which
during the period between the effective date of a tax lien' and
2. E.g., United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958); Glass City Bank v.
United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945); Investment & Sec. Co. v. Robbins, 49 F.
Supp. 620 (ED. Wash. 1943), af'd, 140 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1944).
3. E.g., United States v. Bess, supra note 2; Glass City Bank v. United
States, supra note 2.
4. See United States v. Birrell, 233 F. Supp. 921, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
United States v. itchell, 210 F. Supp. 810, 814-15 (S.D. Ala. 1962).
5. United States v. Hoper, 242 F.2d 468 .(7th Cir. 1957); Behrens v.
United States, 180 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 230 F.d 504 (2d Cir.
1956).
6. E.g., United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958); United States v.
Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100 (8d Cir. 1964). State statutes which purport to exempt
life insurance from the reach of the owner's creditors do not affect the Gov-
ernment's tax collection powers. However, ownership of the policy is deter-
mined by state law.
For convenience the words "taxpayer," "insured," "policyholder," and
"owner" are regarded as synonymous and used interchangeably in this Note.
7. 357 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1958). In Bess the delinquent taxpayer died after a
lien had attached to his "property or rights to property" represented by cash
value in an insurance policy. The Government was allowed to follow the
proceeds into the hands of the beneficiary on the basis of the priority of its
lien. However, the Government was allowed recovery of only that part which
represented cash value at the time of the taxpayer's death. No recovery of
the balance of the proceeds (a sum large enough to cover the tax debt) was
allowed, since the taxpayer had no rights to the proceeds while alive.
The Bess case has been extensively commented upon. E.g., 44 CoRNELiL L.
Q. 278 (1959); 8 DE PAUL L. REv. 131 (1958); 47 Kr. LJ. 556 (1959).
8. See INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 6322. See notes 20-23 infra and accom-
panying text.
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collection against his property may diminish the cash value
available to him and thus the amount of property subject to the
tax lien.' Consequently, the Government has urged the courts
to assist it in minimizing or eliminating this "leakage" (1) by
affording the Government summary remedies for reaching the
cash surrender value of the policies before such "leakage" can
occur, and (2) by subjecting insurers to liability to the Govern-
ment if they permit the diminution in value of liens by allowing
insureds to exercise these contract rights.o
This Note discusses various optional rights relating to cash
surrender value available to a policyholder under a typical life
insurance policy; examines various collection remedies available
to the Government to enforce its liens against cash surrender
value in the hands of the insurer; evaluates the Government's
attempts to thrust upon the insurance companies the risk of
diminution in the cash surrender value of insurance policies
subject to tax liens; and suggests changes in and clarifications
of existing law.
I. POLICY PROVISIONS
In addition to insurance protection, the owner of a typical
life insurance policy commonly obtains rights in a sum called
cash value. This amount represents both a savings factor and
a reserve or prepayment of future premiums; the difference be-
tween it and the face amount of the policy at any time is the
insurance feature of the policy." Cash value is generally avail-
9. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 383 F.2d 187, 142-45 (3d Cir. 1964)
(diminution of cash surrender value through operation of automatic premium
loans); United States v. Birrell, 233 F. Supp. 921, 922-2s (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(diminution of cash surrender value through conversion of policy to extended
term insurance).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, supra note 9, at 142-43; United
States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 110-12, 114, 120 -(3d Cir. 1964).
11. See id. at 105-07; United States v. Bankers' Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 198
F. Supp. 727, 729-30 (D.N.J. 1961), vacated, 383 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1964);
KRUEGER & WAGGONER, TuE LiFE INSURANCE POLICY CONTRACT 178-200
(1953); McGm,, LIFE INsURANCE 309-23, (1959) [hereinafter cited as McGuLL].
KREUGER & WAGGONER, op. cit. supra at 194, explain:
In the level premium system of life insurance the net level premium
must be higher than the monetary value of the annual risk during the
early policy years, and the excess must be accumulated with interest to
provide funds for payment of claims after the age is reached where the
value of the annual risk exceeds the net level premium . . . . On sur-
render of a policy the insurer, being relieved of the obligation to
provide death benefits during future years ... no longer needs to retain
the surrendering policyholder's contributions to the funds . . . . [The
1020
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able to the policyholder upon demand and surrender of the
policy; the insurance obligation of the company is thereby ter-
minated. However, the policyholder may elect to utilize his
cash value in various ways short of surrender and termination.
After the policy has been in force for a specified length of time,
usually two or three years, the insured is entitled to obtain policy
loans in a total amount slightly less than cash value. Cash value
continues in existence after a policy loan is made and increases
as subsequent premiums are paid. However, upon making a
policy loan the insurer establishes a separate loan account to be
set off against cash value in the event of surrender (the net
difference may be termed "cash surrender value"),12 or against
the proceeds of the policy if payment is made to the beneficiary.
Until final settlement of the loan, annual interest, representing
the income which the insurer would have earned had the loan not
been made, is charged to the loan account. Although the policy-
holder may repay a policy loan and the accrued interest thereon,
there is no obligation to do so, and in fact the insurer does not
insured] is equitably entitled to a return equal to the prorata share of
the funds actually accumulated from premiums paid by his group of
policyholders and no longer needed to assure solvency of the company
for the protection of continuing policyholders.
In United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 59 (1958), the Court quoted with ap-
proval Judge Brown's oft-cited explanation of cash value in In re McKinney,
15 Fed. 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1883):
Though this excess of premiums paid is legally the sole property
of the company, still in practical effect, though not in law, it is moneys
of the assured deposited with the company in advance to make up the
deficiency in later premiums .... So long as the policy remains in force
the company has not practically any beneficial interest in it, except
as its custodian, with the obligation to maintain it unimpaired and
suitably invested for the benefit of the insured. This is the practical,
though not the legal, relation of the company to this fund.
But see Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of U.S. v. United States, 831 F.2d 29,
35 n.10 (1st Cir. 1964), where it is said that this characterization is not strictly
accurate:
The amount of real insurance at any moment during the life of the
policy is the difference between the cash surrender value and the face
amount. An election to take the cash value prior to maturity is a dis-
charge of the insurance feature of the contract. We cannot agree
with . . . In re McKinney [supra] . . . . Actually the surrender value is
less than the reserve which must be maintained against the policy. See
Maclean, Life Insurance 181 (8 ed. 1957). Moreover, it represents mat-
ters in addition to an advance for payment of future premiums, or it
would ultimately decrease as the policy approaches maturity. The
fact is, . . . as we might judicially notice, [that in] ordinary life and
endowment policies generally, . . . [cash value] continuously increases.
12. United States v. Sullivan, supra note 10, at 105.
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necessarily expect repayment. The existence of an outstanding
policy loan does not alter the effectiveness of the insurance pro-
tection or the obligation to pay premiums as they fall due."
The typical policy also contains optional, alternative nonfor-
feiture benefits. Under one option the existing cash value will
be used to purchase paid-up life insurance if the insured defaults
in payment of premiums. However, since the insurance coverage
thus acquired is substantially less than that which it replaces,
this option is seldom chosen by insureds.' Under another option
the insured elects, in the event of default, to have the existing
cash value applied to purchase paid-up term insurance for the
face amount of the original policy for as long a period as possible.
The advantage of this option is that insurance coverage at the
original level continues, and for a significant period of time if
a large cash value has been built up. Of course, the disadvantage
inherent in nonrenewable term insurance - deprivation of insur-
ance protection at some future date - is also present. Nonethe-
less, policyholders often elect conversion to extended term in-
surance as the applicable nonforfeiture benefit in case of default.
In fact, many policies provide that the extended term option
shall apply unless the insured specifically elects an alternative.Y
A third option available under the policy to avoid forefeiture
may be automatic premium loans to cover defaults in the pay-
ment of premiums."8 No money is paid to the insured, but the
company makes entries in its books acknowledging premiums
paid and debiting a newly-created loan account. This loan ac-
count operates exactly as the one created upon the extension
of a regular policy loan. Cash value continues in existence; in
fact the immediate effect of the loan is to increase cash value
just as it would have been had the premium been paid by the
insured.17 Of course, the amount payable in event of death or a
13. See United States v. Sullivan, upra note 10, at 105-07. United States
v. Bankers' Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 198 F. Supp. 797, 729-80 (D.N.J. 1961);
KRUEGER & WAGGONER, op. cit. supra note 11; McGIL app. B ("The Speci-
men Ordinary Life Insurance Contract").
14. McGiL 312-14; see United States v. Sullivan, spra note 10, at 105
n.13.
15. McGuL 814-20; see United States v. Sullivan, spra note 10, at 105
n.18.
16. See MAOLEDT, LiFE INsuRANcE 186 (9th ed. 1962): An automatic
premium loan "is not, strictly speaking, a 'nonforfeiture option' or 'option on
lapse' since the policy does not lapse but remains in full force subject to
the loan." This technical distinction is not important for the purposes of
this Note.
17. McGnLL 820-28; see United States v. Sullivan, 883 F.2d 100, upra
note 16 at 106 n.13 (3d Cir. 1964).
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demand for cash value is subject to a setoff of the loan account.
The maturity of the policy determines whether cash surrender
value increases or decreases after an automatic premium loan.s
The right to premium loans, when available, is frequently chosen
as the nonforfeiture option.29
II. PROCEDURES AVAILABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT
FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF TAX LIENS
Ordinarily, considerable time elapses between the Govern-
ment's determination of a tax deficiency and its initiation of
collection proceedings against the delinquent taxpayer's assets.
The first step is normally to notify the taxpayer of the deficiency
and attempt to work out a payment arrangement with himo
If such an arrangement cannot be negotiated or is not adhered
to, the Government formally demands affirmative action by the
18. Because the automatic premium loan option operates to maintain
the flow of premium payments, cash value continues to increase at the same
time as the loan account is increasing. During certain years of a policy's
life, automatic premium loans may cause cash value to increase by a larger
amount than the offsetting loan account and thus create an increase in cash
surrender value. For example, see United States v. Bankers' Natl Life Ins.
Co., 198 F. Supp. 727, 728-29 (D.N.J. 1961), where a policy increased in
cash value from $7,620 to $22,500 (i.e., by $14,880) in 11 years although the
policyholder evidently paid no premiums. At the end of that period the
charge against cash value in the automatic premium loan account was
$12,356. Thus the policyholder, by electing the automatic premium loan
option and without paying any premiums, was able not only to keep the in-
surance in force, but also to realize an increase in cash surrender value of
$2,524.
However, in the early years of a policy an automatic premium loan may
decrease cash surrender value because the amount of the loan exceeds the
increase in cash value. In United States v. Salerno, 229 F. Supp. 664 (D. Nev.
1963), modified sub. nom. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d
71 (9th Cir. 1965), the cash and cash surrender value of the policy when
the lien attached was $979. Subsequently, four automatic premium loans
were made and, with interest added, the total charge in the loan account
was approximately $700. The cash surrender value of the policy upon fore-
closure of the lien was $494. Thus the cash value rose only $215, less than
one-third the amount of the loan account.
19. McGnL 320-23.
20. See Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems (pt. 1), 18 TAX
L. REv. 247 (1957), where it is asserted that the use of drastic measures
such as levy or foreclosure is the exception rather than the rule. "[T]he
Service's policy is not to force the taxpayer into bankruptcy, leave him home-
less, or otherwise oppress him, if he is sincerely trying to make up his delin-
quencies and there is a good chance that he will succeed if given time." Id.
at 283; see MERTENS, FEDERAL INcoM TAXATION H§ 49.104-25 (1958, Supp.
1964, 1965) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
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taxpayer within 90 days.2 At the end of this period, an ad-
ministrative deficiency assessment is issued and demand for
payment served upon the delinquent? 2 The tax lien, establishing
a governmental interest in the taxpayer's property, arises as of
the time of assessment." Notice of the lien is filed in the county
of the taxpayer's residence24 and copies are sent to interested
third parties as the Government becomes aware of them?5 Only
after the taxpayer has refused to pay on demand after assess-
ment of deficiency may the Government move to collect against
his property.26
It has been seen above that collection proceedings may be
initiated only after the taxpayer refuses to pay on demand after
assessment of deficiency. It will be seen below that lengthy col-
lection proceedings produce further delay before collection is
effective against a taxpayer's insurance policy. This part of the
21. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6212-13. This demand is the so-called
ninty-day letter. The Service is prohibited from assessing a deficiency or
attempting to collect it by levy or foreclosure during this period to afford
the taxpayer an opportunity to petition the Tax Court for an adjudication
of its validity. See MERTms § 49.188.
22. Assessing deficiencies is a complex and time-consuming procedure.
Provisions designed to protect the taxpayer and governmental red-tape con-
tribute to delay quick and efficient collection of delinquent taxes. See
MERTENS § 49.180-.226.
23. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6821-22; see MERTENS §§ 54.38-.41.
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Ison, 67 F. Supp. 40, 41 -(S.D.N.Y. 1946);
United States v. Malter, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9485 (S. D. Fla. 1958). Actual
notice is required by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6823(c), to protect the
Government vis-a-vis mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, and judgment credi-
tors. Although § 6323 apparently does not require actual notice to protect
the Government vis-a-vis the taxpayer's general creditors, the courts ap-
parently expect the Government to notify all interested parties of which
it is aware. See notes 84-88 infra and accompanying text. This Note pro-
ceeds upon the assumption that the Government has information relating
to the taxpayer's assets, including his life insurance policies. Obviously this
is not always the case and numerous examples of successful concealment of
assets doubtless exist.
However, § 7206 of the Code provides for a severe penalty, (fine of not
more than $5,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than three years) if a
taxpayer conceals property when seeking a compromise settlement of his
deficiency. A taxpayer whose financial condition is such that the Government
would seek to foreclose upon his rights in life insurance policies is quite likely
to seek a compromise. Thus, there may be no problem in discovering the
identity of the taxpayer's insurers in the usual case.
26. Mrizek v. Long, 187 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Ill. 1959). For purposes of
simplicity this Note does not consider jeojardy assessments under § 6861 of
the Code. See MERTENs H 49.144-.48.
Note focuses upon the problem of "leakage" or diminution in
cash surrender value by operation of the policy during the period
between the effective date of the tax lien and ultimate collection
by the Government.
A. COLLECTION BY FoREcrosURE OF LIEN
It is now well established that the Government may reach the
cash surrender value of a delinquent taxpayer's life insurance
policy by judicial foreclosure of its lien on his rights thereto." In
such a proceeding the court ordinarily has all interested parties
before it - insured, insurer, beneficiary, and the Government -
and can, therefore, order surrender of the policy.2 8 Alternatively,
the court may adjudicate rights to the policy in rem and order
27. In Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. United States, 331 F.d 29, 31 n.2
(1st Cir. 1964), the court summarized the procedure required by § 7408 of
the Code as follows:
[SJubsection (a) . . . provides for an action in the district court "to
enforce the lien of the United States under this title with respect to
such tax or liability or to subject any property, of whatever nature,
of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to
the payment of such tax or liability." . . . (b) . . . provides that all
persons "claiming any interest" in the property shall be made parties.
... (a) ... provides for an adjudication of all matters involved, and
permits a sale of the property by decree of court and distribution in
accordance with the interests of the parties. . . . (d) . . . permits the
court to appoint a receiver with power, inter alia, to enforce the lien.
28. Several courts have indicated that the foreclosure action is a par-
ticularly appropriate method of collecting the cash surrender value of an
insurance policy because it affords judicial protection of the interests of
beneficiaries. E.g., United States v. Sullivan, 383 F.2d 100, 118-21 (3d Cir.
1964); United States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 17, 23-25 (4th
Cir. 1958). In United States v. McWilliams, 234 F. Supp. 117, 123 (D. Conn.
1964), the court stated that the Supreme Court decision in United States
v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 57 n.2 (1958), would seem to require that anyone with
a conflicting claim, such as a beneficiary, must have that claim adjudicated
in a court action. Section 7403 of the Code provides that persons having
an interest in the property shall be made parties in any action to enforce
the lien. This section has been relied upon to protect the interests of bene-
ficiaries. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. United States, supra note 27, at 36.
But see Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1965),
modifying United States v. Salerno, 222 F. Supp. 664 (D. Nev. 1963), where
the court disagreed with the proposition that a beneficiary is an indispensable
party to any proceeding to collect the insured's interest in the policy, and
pointed out that the beneficiary usually has no vested interest in the policy
but only an expectancy subject to termination at the will of the insured
or by court order. See generally, Pyle, Liability of Life Insurance and An-
nuities for Unpaid Income Taxes of Living Insureds, Annuitants, and Bene-
ficiaries, 9 TAx L. REv. 205, 222-27 (1954).
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payment by the insurer when it does not have personal jurisdic-
tion over the insured and the beneficiary so as to be able to order
surrendero
In the event of foreclosure, the judgment of the court will
terminate the policy and the insurer, upon payment of cash sur-
render value to the Government, will no longer be liable to the
insured, whether or not the latter has physically surrendered the
policy.30 The powers of the court in a foreclosure action were
summed up in United States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.:"'
When the insured's interest in the policies is subjected to the tax lien
under this proceeding, this amounts to a seizure of such interest by
the United States. . . . [T]he United States, by virtue of such seizure
may exercise any right which the insured might have exercised under
the policies, including the election to take the cash surrender value....
The court can unquestionably condemn the interest of the insured
under the policies to the satisfaction of the lien and can direct that
such interest be paid by the insurance companies to the United States,
the holder of the lien. This interest is the cash surrender value of the
policies. It is argued . . . that the court may not do this, because the
policies must be surrendered as a condition to obtaining the cash sur-
render value; but the surrender is for the protection of the companies
and they will be as well protected by the judgment of the court as by
the surrender of the policies, since the policies are not negotiable.
Certain considerations of public policy justify requiring the
Government to use judicial foreclosure as its collection device.
The presence of all interested parties at the judicial foreclosure
makes possible the assertion of all interests before the policy is
terminated to pay taxes. Also, the court may fashion a remedy
to protect the beneficiaries and insured to the extent consistent
with the Government's rights, rather than simply ordering can-
cellation of the policy and payment of cash surrender value to the
Government. For instance, the court might order sale of the
policy to a beneficiary, or arrange for the insured to take a policy
29. E.g., United States v. Ball, 326 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 256 F.d 17 (4th Cir. 1958); United
States v. Hopkins, 193 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). In these cases, juris-
diction was premised upon 28 U.S.C. §1655 (1958), which authorizes an
action "to enforce a lien upon . . . real or personal property within the
district" of the court. In such an action service by publication is sufficient
where defendants cannot be served within the state. The insurance company,
which does business within the state, is served personally. The courts reason
that although the insured has left the jurisdiction, he has left behind the
res, to which the lien has attached.
S0. See, e.g., United States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note 29,
at 24-25; United States v. Hopkins, supra note 29, at 210.
31. Supra note 29, at 23-25.
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loan to pay the deficiency." It should be noted that a foreclosure
in rem obviously does not afford an opportunity to the insured
and the beneficiaries to protect their interests. The Second Circuit
recently upheld such a foreclosure action on a matured policy but
criticized the procedure and questioned its propriety if applied to
an unmatured insurance contract. 3
However, from the point of view of the Government, judicial
foreclosure is a disadvantageous collection device because, as with
all litigation, it is expensive, time-consuming, and cumbersome.
The delay lengthens the period between the effectiveness of the
lien and collection of the tax, thus increasing the risk that cash
surrender value will be impaired during the interim through opera-
tion of one of the policy options.
B. COLLECTION BY LEVY ON PROPERTY UNDER A TAX LIEN
As an alternative to foreclosure against the insured's bundle of
policy rights, the Government has attempted to move directly
against cash value in the hands of the insurer by summary ad-
ministrative levy. 4 Collection by levy is very attractive to the
Government. Contrasted with judicial foreclosure it is relatively
32. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. United States, 331 F.ed 29, 37 (1st
Cir. 1964). Examples of judicial discretion in fashioning appropriate remedies
abound in tax lien cases: see United States v. Roark, 1957-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9883 (W.D. Mo. 1957), new judgment directed by parties' stipulation, 263
F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1959) (taxpayer ordered to demand cash value and pay
it into court); United States v. Ison, 67 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (tax-
payer ordered to assign his policy to the United States); United States v.
Trout, 46 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (receiver appointed, presumably
to exercise loan provision and pay proceeds to Government). See also Schwarz
v. United States, 191 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1951); Smith v. Donnelly, 65 F.
Supp. 415 (E.D. La. 1946).
33. In Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. United States, supra note 32, at
37-38, the rule enunciated in United States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
256 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1958), was criticized on the basis that 28 U.S.C. § 1655
provides for the setting aside of any judgment reached in the absence of a
defendant who was not personally served upon the behest of the defaulting
defendant, and upon his payment of costs within one year of entry of judg-
ment. The court suggested that to protect this right where a lien upon an
insurance policy is foreclosed, it may be necessary to limit recovery to the
loan value of the policy, as opposed to its cash surrender value, pending
expiration of one year from entry of judgment.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Brody, 213 F. Supp. 905 (D. Mass. 1963),
aff'd sub no. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. United States, 331 F.2d 29
(1st Cir. 1964); United States v. Bankers' Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 198 F. Supp.
727 (D.NJ. 1961), vacated and remanded for new trial, 333 F.2d 145 (3d
Cir. 1964).
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inexpensive, simple, and quick, and therefore will shorten the
period of potential leakage of cash value after attachment of the
tax lien.
The Government is authorized by statute to seize and sell
property or rights to property to which a tax lien has attached
to satisfy assessed deficiencies.35 Subject only to certain excep-
tions for bare necessities," this power of levy is available against
the delinquent taxpayer's real and personal property, both tan-
gible and intangible,3 7 whether in his or a third party's posses-
sion." The statute thus contemplates that the Government may
levy on property in the hands of the taxpayer's bailees, including
property which takes the form of a debt owed the taxpayer." If a
third party fails to turn over property or pay a debt upon levy
35. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6831(a) provides in part:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the
same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for
the Secretary or his delegate to collect such tax (and such further sum
as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon
all property and rights to property (except such property as is exempt
under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there is a
lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax....
Levy is said to include the power of distraint and seizure by any means.
TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6331(b).
36. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6334(a), exempts clothing, necessary tools,
and a limited amount of provisions, furniture, livestock, and personal effects.
Section 6334(c) provides that these exemptions shall be exclusive.
37. The scope of the statutory power of levy thus reaches far beyond
that of common-law distraint, since the latter historically reached only
tangible personal property. Originally a means by which a private party
took possession of the personal property of another to enforce a debt or
duty, distraint later came to be used to collect taxes. See United States
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F. Supp. 30, 35-36 (D. Conn. 1942); BRETwsTR,
DIsTRAiNT UNDER THE FEDERAL REVENUE LAws 4-8 (1937).
38. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6332(a) provides:
Any person in possession of (or obligated with respect to) prop-
erty or rights to property subject to levy upon which a levy has
been made shall, upon demand of the Secretary or his delegate, sur-
render such property or rights (or discharge such obligation) to the
Secretary or his delegate ....
39. E.g., Bank of Nevada v. United States, 251 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1958);
United States v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 198 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1959);
United States v. Bowery Say. Bank, 185 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Any possible distinction between distraint upon property in the possession
of the debtor and garnishment of property in the possession of a third party
has generally been ignored in construing the scope of the Government's levy.
E.g., United States v. Eiland, 228 F.d 118 (4th Cir. 1955); United States
v. Morris & E.R.R. 135 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1943); see Note, 52 YALE
L.J. 928, 930-31 (1943).
and demand, he is liable to the Government for an amount equal
to the value of the property or the amount of the debt or the
amount of the tax liability upon which the levy is based, which-
ever is less.40 Of course, the third party may defend on the ground
that the taxpayer's property is not in his possession 41 Payment to
the Government of property or an obligation subject to levy is a
complete defense in a subsequent action brought by the taxpayer-
creditor against the third party.4 2
Levy upon cash value in the hands of the insurer to satisfy a
tax obligation was upheld in several early cases However, three
courts of appeals held in 1942 that this was not an appropriate
collection method. Two recent court of appeals decisions, United
States v. Sullivan4 " and Equitable Life Assur. So'y v. United
States,46 reaffirm these holdings.
The most persuasive legal argument against levy directly upon
an insurer is that cash value is not itself property of the insured
in the possession of the insurer, as required by the levy statute.
This is premised on the view that where a contract calls for
alternative performances at the obligee's choice, the obligor owes
neither until the obligee makes his choice.47 Since cash value is
not a specific debt, it is not property of the insured; it constitutes
merely an integral part of the entire "bundle of rights"48 - one
of several alternative performances among which the insured may
choose. Because the Government may levy only as a lienor and
not as an owner,49 it follows that levy cannot serve as an exercise
40. IT. REV. CODE O 1954, § 6332(b).
41. See United States v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 198 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1952); 9 MERTENs § 49.203.
42. E.g., United States v. Bowery Say. Bank, 297 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1961);
United States v. Eiland, 223 Fad 118 (4th Cir. 1955).
48. See, e.g., Kyle v. McGuirk, 82 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1936); Columbian
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 15 F. Supp. 777 (D. Mass. 1936), aff'd, 88 F.2d
338 (1st Cir. 1937).
44. United States v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 495 (3d Cir.);
United States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 149 (2d Cir.); United
States v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.2d 880 (1st Cir.). See also
Pyle, supra note 28, at 825-29; Note, 52 YALE L.J. 928 (1948).
45. 333 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1964).
46. 331 F.d 29 (1st Cir. 1964); of. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
343 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1965).
47. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. United States, supra note 46, at 831
F.2d 35.
48. United States v. Sullivan, 383 F.2d 100, 110.
49. Id. at 116-17. The court noted that trustees or court-appointed re-
ceivers have the power to step into the shoes of the taxpayer and, as owner,
convert cash value into a matured obligation. See Cohen v. Samuels, 245
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of the owner's option to receive cash value and thereby create
property in the hands of the insurer in the form of an uncondi-
tional debt.50 By analogous reasoning state courts have held that
cash value is beyond the reach of private creditors under state
garnishment statutes."'
However, strong legal arguments can be made for permitting
levy directly upon cash value in the hands of the insurer. In
United States v. Bess the Supreme Court held that although cash
value is "'legally the sole property of the company,'" it "should
be treated for some purposes as though in fact a 'fund' held by
the insurer for the benefit of the insured."s One court apparently
took this holding to mean that the "fund" was property against
which levy could be made."4 This assumes that physical surrender
and election by the insured are not necessary to bring cash value
itself, as opposed to the insured's "bundle of rights," under the tax
lien. Recognition by the courts in the lien foreclosure cases that
an election of cash value by the insured is not necessary to fore-
close the Government's lien on the policy weighs in favor of
treating cash value as a presently owing obligation upon which
U.S. 50 (1917); 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. f§ 110(a)(3), (5) (1958). How-
ever, the levy statute cannot be read to confer comparable authority on the
Government.
50. The court stated in Equitable Life that "the insurance obligation
[coverage] was already operative. The company would remain liable for that
obligation unless some positive action, binding on the insured, could affirm-
atively terminate it. . . ." 331 F.2d at 99, 35.
51. E.g., Marquis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 92 Ohio App. 389, 108
N.E.2d 227 (1952); Pick v. Pick, 54 Wash. 2d 772, 345 P.2d 181 (1959);
Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 261 (1954); see Cohen, The Attachment of Life Insurance
Policies, 26 CoNmE L.Q. 213 (1941). But see Biggert v. Straub, 193 Mass.
77, 78 N.E. 770 (1906); Industrial Loan & Inv. Co. v. Missouri State Life
Ins. Co. 222 Mo. App. 1228, 3 S.W.2d 1046 (1928).
These cases reflect a strong judicial predisposition to avoid serious
prejudice to the beneficiaries of insurance policies. See Isaac Van Dyke Co.
v. Moll, 241 Mich. 255, 259, 217 N.W. 29, 3o (1928), where the court said:
"If garnishment will here lie, it could be enforced by a creditor were the in-
sured at time of service lying on a sick bed with dissolution near at hand."
52. 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
53. Id. at 59.
54. United States v. Salerno, 222 F. Supp. 664 (D. Nev. 1963), modified
sub nom. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 71 (9th Cir., 1965).
In the district court the insurer was held liable for diminution of cash value
through the operation of the automatic premium loan provision of the policy
after receiving notice of levy and demand under the penalty statute, § 6332.
Until recently, the Salerno case stood as authority directly contrary to the
holdings in Sullivan and Equitable Life. The Ninth Circuit modified the
decision by excluding the judgment for penalty against the insurer.
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levy should operate. Moreover, there is some judicial support for
the view that levy is a "meaningful demand for whatever amount
the insured could then require the insurer to pay him.""~r
Nevertheless, the cases are unanimous in refusing to permit
levy against cash value in the hands of an insurer and have con-
sistently distinguished the Bess decision. They emphasize that
Bess held cash value to be property "for some purposes" only."6
Thus, although cash value was held to be property to which a
lien attached, under the facts of Bess this was not a determination
that it was also property subject to levy. Other factual distinc-
tions between the situation under discussion and that in Bess are
also stressed to demonstrate that levy on the insurer was not a
"purpose" contemplated by the Supreme Court.ar
Considerations of public policy would seem to dictate that levy
against cash value as a debt owed the insured in the hands of the
insurer should not be made available to the Government. Al-
55. United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 122 (3d Cir. 1964) (dissenting
opinion). Sullivan was a 6-1 decision. The lone dissenting judge agreed with
the district court decision in Salerno, see note 54 supra, that notice of levy
was a meaningful demand upon the insurer and would have fixed the mini-
mum recoverable sum as the cash value of the policy at that time. Cf. Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, supra note 54, modifying the Salerno
decision, where it was held that the Government had erroneously attempted
to levy on cash value in the hands of the insurer as if it were equivalent to
cash or a matured debt. The court reasoned that the Government had failed
to follow the requirement of the levy statute that a distraint sale be held
for property (other than cash or its equivalent) seized by levy:
We are not, then, faced with the question (which both Sullivan and
Equitable Life seem to have answered in the negative) whether there
was any property at all belonging to the insured in the possession
of the insurer which could be reached by levy and realized upon
by sale.
343 F.2d at 74 n.5. This language may be construed to imply that levy upon
the insured's "bundle of rights" in the hands of the insurer may be available
if the Government follows the statutory requirements. However, the court
did not develop this possibility.
56. United States v. Sullivan, supra note 55, at 111-12; Equitable Life
Assur. Soe'y v. United States, 331 F.2d 29, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1964); United
States v. Birrell, 233 F. Supp. 921, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
57. United States v. Sullivan, supra note 55, at 111, Equitable Life Assur.
Soc'y v. United States, supra note 56 at 35-37, and United States v. Birrell,
supra note 56, at 923, carefully distinguish Bess as a case which dealt with
the rights of the insured and not those of the insurer. The Bess Court had
pointed out that the insured had died and the policies therefore matured.
The case consequently is read as holding that the Governments tax lien
will not be defeated by the fortuitous intervening death of the insured, and
not as controlling any questions raised in connection with executory in-
surance contracts.
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though summary levy is clearly the most efficient means by which
the Government can reach the cash value of an insurance policy,
on balance it has significant undesirable features. It is a drastic
and blunt instrument."5 Contrasted with judicial foreclosure, at
which all interested parties ordinarily are present and heard before
any property interests are affected, levy on cash value cuts off
beneficiaries' rights without affording them an opportunity to
protect their interests."9 For reasons relating to the health and life
expectancy of the insured, cash value represents only the mini-
mum worth of the policy."o It therefore would seem unjust to
terminate a policy by the levy procedure that the Government
has attempted to use.
The Code affords the delinquent taxpayer a right to redeem
property seized by levy prior to sale.ex However, the Government
has attempted to levy on cash value as the equivilent of cash
which would not require a distraint sale.62 Such a procedure would
terminate the insurance policy, thereby thwarting any possibility
of meaningful redemption. This situation has seemingly influenced
the courts against permitting such levy." Yet the levy and re-
demption statutes nowhere specifically provide that levy is avail-
able only as to property which will be preserved for possible re-
demption. Moreover, bank accounts and other debts are regularly
58. United States v. Sullivan, supra note 55, at 118; Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y v. United States, supra note 56, at 86; United States v. Stock
Yards Bank, 281 F. 2d 628, 631 (6th Cir. 1956).
59. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
60. See Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. United States, 831 F.2d 29, 86
(1st Cir. 1964), where the court emphasized that because of poor health the
taxpayer may not be reinsurable at any price.
61. INT. REV. CoDE or 1954, § 6387(a).
62. See notes 119-24 infra and accompanying text.
63. The court said in Sullivan, 838 F.2d at 118:
First and foremost, [the redemption provision] strongly tends to in-
dicate that the remedy of levy and distraint was not meant to be
applied against assets in such a manner as to destroy them by that
very action. Second, it manifestly makes relevant considerations of
fairness to the insured, albeit possibly delinquent, taxpayer. . . . A
right of redemption would be of no utility in the present circumstance
and would therefore be illusory. Moreover, the instant situation repre-
sents the very type of case in which such a right would be of most
critical import and practical utility inasmuch as the value of an in-
surance policy of the present nature is not strictly defined by its
monetary worth.
See also the discussion of the redemption statute and its affect on the avail-
ability of levy in the Equitable Life case, 381 F.2d at 86-38.
loss
levied on, although no property survives, 4 and the 1954 Code
specifically provides for the collection of intangible assets by levy
on the obligor." However, seizure of a matured debt is really
not prejudicial to the taxpayer since the value of the debt is
applied to his tax liability and its seizure does not deprive him of
more value than that for which he receives credit. 6 On the other
hand, since cash value represents the minimum worth of the in-
surance, its summary seizure will most probably result in a tax
credit of less value than the true worth of the asset which the
taxpayer has lost.
Even in the absence of an effective right of redemption, it is
arguable that levy upon cash value ought to be permitted since
the delinquent taxpayer had ample opportunity to protect his
and the beneficiaries' interests before resort to levy was made.
He could have paid his taxes in the first place or during the
investigation period. Or he could have arranged a policy loan to
the satisfaction of the Government. These suggestions may afford
little solace for the taxpayer who believes that no deficiency
exists. Actual liability may not be determined for several years -
until administrative and judicial review of the merits of the assess-
ment have run their course. Yet levy is available upon assessment
of deficiency by the Internal Revenue Service. 6 7 And it is clear
that unlike judicial foreclosure of a lien,6 8 levy is not subject to
a defense that the underlying deficiency assessment is without
merit. 9
64. See, e.g., United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1955); United
States v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 198 F.ad 366 (2d Cir. 1952).
65. rNT. REv. Con OF 1954, i 6332(a), incorporated the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, § 3710, with the following change (italicized): "Any person
in possession of (or obligated with respect to) property or rights to property"
shall surrender them to the collector.
66. Compare note 60 supra and accompanying text.
67. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Rindskopf, 105 U.S. 418 (1881); United
States v. O'Connor, 291 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1961); Bowers v. American Sur.
Co., 30 F.2d 244, 245 (2d Cir. 1929); Quinn v. Hook, 231 F. Supp. 718 (E.D.
Pa. 1964).
The correctness of the deficiency assessment is conclusive and immune
to challenge when collection is sought by means of levy, but only presumptive
and subject to adjudication when the Government attempts to foreclose its
lien. The O'Connor case, supra, contains an excellent analysis of the rule and
examination of the legislative history of the relevant statutes.
69. See, e.g., Abel v. Campbell, 334 F.2d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1964); United
States v. First Capital Nat'l Bank, 89 F.2d 116, 124 (8th Cir. 1937); United
States v. City State Bank, 19 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. Tenn. 1937); United States
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However the taxpayer will normally petition the Tax Court for
an adjudication of the validity of the assessment if he questions
it.70 Until this decision becomes final, no levy may be made.7'
Thus the taxpayer would be subjected to levy on the basis of an
assessment which he believes to be erroneous only if he fails to
file a petition for review. The effect of permitting levy in this
context would therefore be to require the taxpayer to protect his
property from the Government's claim by asserting his defense to
the assessment in the Tax Court rather than waiting for the
Government to move against his property.
III. INSURER'S LIABILITY FOR DIMINUTION OF CASH
VALUE OF INSURANCE POLICY SUBJECT TO TAX LIEN
Thwarted in its attempts to levy on cash value directly, the
Government has advanced arguments which, if upheld by the
courts, would prevent or diminish its loss of tax revenue from
leakage of cash value through operation of the insurance contract
by fixing liability for such leakage upon the insurers in various
situations. The situations involved and the theories invoked are
discussed in this part of the Note.
A. CHARACTERIZING THE INSURER AS A CREDITOR
The Government has argued that an insurer becomes a creditor
with a security interest in the policy when it makes policy or
automatic premium loans.72 Certainly an insurer in this position
resembles a creditor in several respects: it maintains a separate
loan account, charges interest, carries the loan on its books as an
account receivable, and often receives investment credit for the
loan under state regulations.78 If the insurer is regarded as a
v. American Exch. Irving Trust Co., 43 F.2d 829, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); 9
1IERTENS § 49.202.
70. The other traditional method of challenging an erroneous assessment
-payment and suit for refund under § 7422 of the Code-is clearly inappli-
cable to the context here under discussion.
71. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6213; see notes 20-23 supra and accom-
panying text.
72. See e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 203 F. Supp. 1, 12 (W.D. Pa.
1962), af'd, 333 F.2d 100, 112-13 (Sd Cir. 1964); United States v. Bankers'
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 198 F. Supp. 727 (D.N.J. 1961), vacated and remanded
for new trial, 333 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1964); United States v. Wilson, 191 F.
Supp. 69 (D.N.J.) aff'd on rehearing, 195 F. Supp. 332 (D.N.J. 1961), vacated
and new trial ordered, 333 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1964). In Bankers' and Wilson
the district court sustained this argument.
73. United States v. Sullivan, supra note 72 at 12, 333 F.2d at 118.
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creditor secured by cash value to which a tax lien has attached,
soie determination of priority of lien will be required to resolve
conflicts between the insurer and the Government. While general
in the sense that it attaches to all of the taxpayer's property, the
tax lien has been found to be "perfect" and "choate" as to each
specific piece of property.74 Consequently the Government would
be protected from leakage of collectible assets through loans made
by an insurer-creditor after attachment of the tax lien.75 The
claims of private creditors, even though perfected under state law,
have usually been found "inchoate," under a rather stringent
federal test, and therefore inferior even to subsequently attaching
tax liens.7 6 It is likely that policy and premium loans would be
regarded as creating inchoate liens upon the policies under which
74. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954); An-
derson, Federal Tax Liens-Their Nature and Priority, 41 CAI. L. REV.
241, 243-44 (1953).
75. Cf. Bank of Nevada v. United States, 251 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958); United States v. Malter, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9485 (S.D. Fla. 1958); United States v. Royce Shoe Co., 137 F. Supp. 786
(D.N.H. 1956).
Of course, if assignment of the policy to a creditor is made prior to the
attachment of the lien, the creditor has first claim. In this situation the
taxpayer has no property or rights to property in the policy when the lien
arises to which it could attach. United States v. Schatz, 7 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 1050 (N.D. Ill. 1961); United States v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y,
1958-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9315 (E.D. Tenn. 1958). Of., Commissioner v. Stem,
357 U.S. 39 (1958), where the insured died before the tax deficiency had
been assessed against him and it was held that since the lien had not attached
to any rights of the insured prior to his death, the Government could not
follow cash value into the hands of the beneficiary as was done in United
States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958). Three Justices dissented in Stern, 357
U.S. at 47, and the result has been criticized elsewhere as inconsistent with
Bess, since the distinction between the two rests wholly upon the fortuitous
circumstance that in Stern the insured died prior to the assessment of the
tax deficiency. See Special Comm. on Federal Liens, ABA, Report, 84 A.B.A.
REP. 645, 683 (1959).
76. To be choate under federal law, a lien must meet three tests: (1) the
property subject to the lien must be established; (2) the identity of the
claimant adverse to the Government must be definite and certain; and (3)
the claim must be in an exact amount which has been determined with
finality - ordinarily by the entry of a final judgment. E.g., United States v.
R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958) (rights of surety under per-
formance bond held inferior to subsequently arising tax lien); United States
v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15, reversing 134 Colo. 548, 307 P.2d 475 (1957) (re-
corded mechanics lien held inferior to subsequent tax lien); United States
v. Acri, 848 U.S. 211 (1955) (attachment lien perfected by state law inferior
to later tax lien); United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S.
47 (1950); see, e.g., Brown, Process of Latw, Foreward to The Supreme Court,
1957 Term, 72 Hanv. L. REv. 77, 82-87 (1958); Burroughs, The Choate Lien
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they were made. Thus the insurer's claim to set off its loans
against cash value would probably fail even as to loans made after
the lien attached.
However, the courts have rejected the Government's argu-
ments that insurers should be characterized as creditors when
they make policy and premium loans. They have held instead
that, notwithstanding the form of these transactions, the com-
panies are in substance debtors rather than creditors." In doing
so they have relied upon the following factors: Under the terms
of the policies, loans must be made upon the demand of the
policyholder; the "interest" charge is merely an estimate of what
would have been earned by the company if no advance had been
made; the form of the transaction is merely an accounting pro-
cedure used by the insurer for its own convenience; and, no
obligation rests upon the policyholder to repay.78
Considerations of public policy support the results of these
cases. It is undesirable to force the companies into a position
where they must either incur double liability79 or breach their
Doctrine, 1963 DUKE L.J. 449; Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the
Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Ischoate and General
Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954); Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien
Problems (pts. 1-2), 13 TAx L. REv. 247, 459 (1957-1958); Wolson, Federal
Tax Liens- A Study in Confusion and Confiscation (pts. 1-9), 65 CoM. L.J.
75, 133 (1960), 43 Aug. L. REV. 180 (1959); Note, 43 Mnot. L. REv. 755
(1959).
The favorable treatment accorded the tax lien is said to be based
upon the Government's imperative need for revenue. Bull v. United States,
295 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1935); see Anderson, supra note 74, at 242.
77. E.g., Board of Assessors v. New York Life Ins. Co., 216 U.S. 517
(1910) (followed by numerous federal and state courts); United States v.
Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1964); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y
v. United States, 331 F.2d 29, 34-35 (1st Cir. 1964); United States v.
Mitchell, 210 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Ala. 1962).
In Board of Assessors, 216 U.S. at 522, Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
The so-called liability of the policy-holder never exists as a personal
liability, it never is a debt, but is merely a deduction in account from
the sum that the . . . [insurer] ultimately must pay ... . In substance
it is extinct from the beginning, because . . . [the transfer of funds] is
a payment, not a loan.
78. See United States v. Sullivan, note 77 supra.
79. In United States v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 495, 498 (3d
Cir. 1942), the court stated that "the result in a case such as the present
would be to require the insurance company to pay doubly when the policy
binds it to pay singly." In United States v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 127 F.2d 880, 884 (1st Cir. 1942), the court said more tentatively that
"we cannot say with confidence that there would be no danger of a double
liability if the government should prevail in the case at bar."
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insurance contractsso at the possible risk of subjecting themselves
to disciplinary action by state insurance commissions. Further-
more, the commercial practices of insurance companies in apply-
ing cash value to policy or premium loans resemble those of one
paying a debt more than one making a loan. Because the insurer
never advances more than cash value, it checks only its own
records before honoring policyholders' demands. It does not
check the owner's credit or search appropriate lien records.8 '
Requiring it to take such precautions solely to escape double
liability on account of the tax delinquencies of the policyholder
would be to impose an unreasonable burden.'
B. CHARACTERIZING THE INSURER AS A DEBTOR OR OBLIGOR
1. Attachment and Filing of Lien
At one time concern existed among some legal writers that at-
tachment of a tax lien would compel obligors of a delinquent
taxpayer to pay their debts to the Government or risk double
liability even though notice of the lien had not been filed."3 The
80. See Columbian Mut. Life Assur. Soc'y v. Whitehead, 193 Ark. 598,
101 S.W.2d 455 (1937); 3 ApprmrAw, INSURANcE LAW AN PRAcTIcE H 1731,
1865 (1941).
81. See United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 113 (3d Cir. 1964).
82. Six of the defendant insurance companies in a companion case tried
with Sullivan made 1,408,051 policy loans totaling $455,298,956 during 1960.
A survey by one of the companies estimated that a normal search of lien
records would cost six dollars per policy. 333 F.2d at 113. See Pyle, Liability
of Life Insurance and Annuities for Unpaid Income Taxes of Living In-
sureds, Annuitants, and Beneficiaries, 9 TAx L. REv. 205, 209 (1954). Ob-
viously, an insurance company could not search the lien records of some
3000 counties to determine whether notice of a tax lien had been filed against
a policyholder.
83. See, e.g., Rankin & Funk, The Desirability of Amending the Internal
Revenue Code as to Tax Liens on Bank Collateral and Bank Deposits, 8
Bus. LAw. 39 (1953); Note, Effect of a Federal Tax Lien on a Bank De-
posit, 42 IowA L. REv. 419 (1957).
In Beeghly v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 726, 730 (N.D. Iowa 1957), the court
stated by way of dictum that:
Where there is a tax lien outstanding, .. . if the Government chose
to enforce that lien against intangibles to the fullest extent, then any
bank paying a check of such taxpayer, any insurance company making
payments of cash surrender values, . . . any party settling either a
contract or tort claim . . . would be subject to the hazard of paying
the same over again to the Government. . . . It would appear that the
Government . . . has been sparing in its enforcement of tax liens
against intangibles of the kind noted.
One of the leading writers on the subject of federal tax liens, Walter T.
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Government recently advocated this position."' Even if this view
were rejected, it could be argued that filing the lien in the county
of residence operates as constructive notice to the taxpayer's
obligors, so that they thereafter make payment to the taxpayer
at their peril. 5 However, the courts have uniformly rejected both
arguments. It seems clear, therefore, that a debtor-obligor may
safely pay his creditor without searching the records to discover
tax liens against the creditor." The Fourth Circuit recently
stated:8 7
[D]ebtors could not be expected to search the clerk's office before
paying a debt, to see whether or not tax liens had been filed against
their creditors, nor could banks be expected to make such search before
honoring checks drawn upon deposits. ... Prior to . .. [actual notice a]
debtor may discharge his debt by payment to the creditor, whatever
may have been filed in the clerk's office.
Originally, the Commissioner took the position in a revenue
ruling that insurers who grant policy loans or pay out cash value
before actual notice of the lien would not be liable to the Govern-
ment for doing so." This ruling was subsequently withdrawn with
respect to policy loans, 9 apparently to test the argument that the
insurer acts as a creditor in extending such loans.9o Since this argu-
ment was recently rejected by the courts, it appears that the Gov-
ernment has been forced back to the position of conceding that
mere attachment or filing of the tax lien does not operate to fix
Plumb, Jr., debunks the suggestion that debtors paying debts without notice
of the tax lien may be subject to double liability by stating that "the history
of recent litigation is persuasive that the Government's failure to argue for
such a position is based not on self-restraint, but entirely upon a conviction
that the position could not possibly be sustained." Plumb, supra note 76,
at 809.
84. United States v. Wilson, 191 F. Supp. 69 (D.N.J.), aff'd oan reargu-
ment, 195 F. Supp. 32 (D.N.J. 1961), rev'd, 333 F.2d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 1964).
85. See Rankin & Funk, supra note 83.
86. E.g., United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 115 (3d Cir. 1964);
United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118, 121-22 (4th Cir. 1955); accord, United
States v. Jacobs, 155 F. Supp. 182 (D.N.J. 1957). In Jacobs the court said
that if the Government fails to serve notice of the lien on the taxpayer's
obligor, the latter may pay the taxpayer-creditor without risking liability
to the Government. See United States v. Polan Indus., Inc., 196 F. Supp.
333, 338 (S.D.W. Va. 1961); Special Comm. on Federal Liens, ABA, Report,
84 A.B.A. REP. 645, 726 (1959).
87. United States v. Eiland, supra note 86, at 122.
88. Rev. Rul. 48, 1956-1 CUM. BuLL. 561.
89. Rev. Rul. 54, 1963-1 CUM. BuLL. 306.
90. The Government argued in two district court cases that policy and
automatic premium loans constitute a credit arrangement. However, this
position was abandoned on appeal. See note 72 supra.
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the extent of the insurer's liability to the Government.91 This
would seem to be proper. Ordinarily the effect of a lien is merely
to establish the interest of a creditor vis-a-vis others asserting
claims against the same property, and some other doctrine must
be relied upon to direct the debtor to discharge his debt to a
lienor rather than the creditor.
2. Actual Notice of Lien to Insurers
It has been suggested that actual notice of a tax lien imposes
upon unconditional debtors of a delinquent taxpayer the duty
to discharge their debts only to the Government at the risk of
subjecting themselves to double liability if they fail to do so. One
school of thought asserts that this liability arises because the tax
lien acts similarly to garnishment, with actual notice of the lien
being equivalent to notice of garnishment.9 2 The effect of garnish-
ment is to bind the property of a person in the hands of his obligor
(the garnishee) so as to make the garnishee act at his own risk if
he delivers the property to his obligee or a third person pending
collection proceedings." Alternatively, it is sometimes suggested
that this liability results from the debtor's tortious impairment
of the tax lien by payment to the taxpayer-creditor, who may
squander the money." Thus it was said in United States v. Sulli-
91. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 333 F.2d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 1964);
Equitable Life Assur, Soc'y v. United States, 331 F.2d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1964);
United States v. Salerno, 222 F. Supp. 664, 666 (D. Nev. 1963), modified
sub nosm. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1965).
92. E.g., Kirby v. United States, 329 F.2d 735, 736 n.3 (10th Cir. 1964);
United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 1955).
93. 6 A16. Jun. 9D, Attachment and Garnishment §§ 446, 450, 511, 512
(1963); see 38 C.J.S., Garnishment H§ 172, 173, 175(b), 185, 186(a) (1943).
As a general rule, a creditor perfects a lien upon a debt through court proc-
ess of garnishment with service of notice upon his debtor's obligor. The
creditor thereby obtains a lien upon the indebtedness for an amount not ex-
ceeding his judgment. See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268,
297 (1870); Rickman v. Rickman, 180 Mich. 224, 146 N.W. 609 (1914); 6
Amt. Jun. 2D, Attachment and Garnishment §§ 1-12 (1963).
94. See Rogge, The Tax Lien of the United States, 13 A.B.A.J. 576, 581
(1927); Plumb, note 776 supra, at 307-11, who notes an analogy between the
liability of a bank with notice of a tax lien and the "liability that a bank may
incur when it honors checks on a fiduciary account with knowledge of circum-
stances indicating a breach of trust." Id. at 308 n.394. (Citations omitted.)
See also Savings Bank v. Loewe, 242 U.S. 357 (1917).
At common law, tort liability resulted from the impairment of a non-
possessory lien if property was negligently or willfully transferred in a manner
by which the lien was destroyed. See Michalson v. All, 43 S.C. 459, 21 S.E.
323 (1895). No cases involving the liability of insurance companies or banks
for such a tort with respect to tax liens were found, probably because such
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1018
van that upon receiving actual notice a duty arises not to act
inconsistently with the lien?"
The practice of banks illustrates the application of the doc-
trines discussed above. The Government normally advises a bank
to protect itself from incurring double liability following receipt
of actual notice of a lien against its depositor's property by notify-
ing the Director of Internal Revenue of any demand against the
assets and withholding payment until receiving his instructionsYe
The threat of double liability under either of the theories usually
causes the bank to "freeze" its depositor's account upon receiving
such notice
In light of the above, the Government might well assert that
after receipt of actual notice of a tax lien, the insurer bears the
risk of all subsequent diminutions of cash value by operation of
the policy." In making this argument substantial reliance would
no doubt be placed upon United States v. Bess," where the Su-
preme Court indicated that the insured's right to cash surrender
value constitutes "property" or "rights to property" to which a
tax lien may attach. However, Bess arose from an effort by the
Government to trace the insured's right to cash surrender value
immediately prior to his death into the hands of the beneficiary
after the policy had matured. It was not sought to hold the
insurer liable for having performed its obligations under the
matured contract subsequent to attachment of the tax lien. Later
lower court decisions arising from attempts by the Government to
hold insurers liable for their applications of cash surrender value
pursuant to policy obligations after attachment of the tax lien
have emphasized the peculiarity of the facts in Bess00 and dis-
institutions are very willing to cooperate with the Government. See Plumb,
supra note 76, at 308; text accompanying note 110 infra.
95. 333 Fed 100, 114 (3d Cir. 1964).
96. Rev. Rul. 367, 1957-2 Cum. Buin. 846. The possibility that the banks
will incur double liability if they satisfy their depositor's demands after notice
and thereby diminish the collectible value of the lien is a somewhat academic
point, however, since the Government ordinarily does not merely give notice
to banks but rather makes a summary levy on the account. Special Comm. on
Federal Liens, ABA, Report, 84 A.B.A. REP. 645, 654-55 (1959).
97. See Plumb, supra note 76, at 808.
98. See United States v. Mitchell, 210 F. Supp. 810, 815 (S.D. Ala. 1962);
of. United States v. Wilson, 333 F.2d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 1964); United States
v. Sullivan, 838 F.2d 100, 116 (3d Cir. 1964).
99. 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 111 (3d Cir. 1964);
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. United States, 331 F.2d 29, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1964);
United States v. Birrell, 233 F. Supp. 921, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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tinguished that case in reliance upon the statement of that Court
that "cash surrender value should be treated for some purposes
as though in fact a 'fund' held by the insurer for the benefit of the
insured."' 0 These courts have argued that so long as the obliga-
tion of the insurer to apply cash value is contingent upon the
election of the policyholder or the maturation of the policy, the
insurer holds no "property" as a "fund" of the insured in the sense
of an unconditional obligation to make a disbursement to the
latter.o2 As will be shown in the following discussion of specific
policy provisions, the effect of this distinction is to avoid requiring
an insurer with actual notice to choose between risking double
liability and seriously prejudicing the interests of the insured and
the beneficiaries in the policy.
a. Payment of Cash Value on Surrender or Extension of a
Policy Loan After Receipt of Actual Notice
In United States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Go.103 the court
stated by way of dictum that after actual notice the insurance
companies "were bound to take ... [tax liens] into account before
101. 357 U.S. at 59 (1957). (Emphasis added.) The Bess Court approved
the statement in In re McKinney, 15 Fed. 535, 537 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883), that
while the "practical, though not the legal, relation of the company to . . .
[cash value is as its] custodian, with the obligation to maintain it unimpaired
and suitably invested for the benefit of the insured ... [it is] legally the sole
property of the company."
102. United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1964);
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. United States, 331 F.2d 29, 86-37 (1st Cir.
1964); United States v. Birrell, 233 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The
Sullivan court stated that nothing in the Bess opinion even implied "that the
tax lien attached to any specifIc property held by the insurers." (Emphasis
added.) The Equitable Life court stated that the Supreme Court was "very
carefully not saying . .. [that cash value] was a fund. It was not a holding
that the surrender value was an open debt . . . ." It should be noted that
neither court stated that the insurer held no property of the insured, to which
the tax lien might attach. Rather, the courts were merely saying that if the
"bundle of rights" of the insured were regarded as being in the possession of
the insurer, this "property" could not be treated as a fund to which a lien
might attach.
But see Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 353 F.2d 71 (9th Cir.
1965); United States v. Burgo, 175 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1949). The Mutual Life
court indicated that the Sullivan and Equitable Life cases suggested that the
insurer has no property at all in its possession belonging to the insured prior
to an election. Id. at 74 n.5. However, this is an incorrect reading of these
holdings since both courts held that they could, in a foreclosure action, fashion
an appropriate remedy and order the insurer to comply. This can only mean
that the lien attaches to the "bundle of rights" held by the insurer.
103. 256 F.2d 17, 22 (4th Cir. 1958), 44 VA. L. REv. 783.
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making any payments to the insured under the terms of the
policies." Insurance companies make such "payments to the in-
sured under the terms of the policies" only in effecting policy
loans or paying cash value on surrender. Similarly the Sullivan
court, although generally hostile to the Government's positions,
stated that upon receipt of actual notice, "a duty arises on the
part of the insurer to act in a manner consistent with safeguard-
ing the Government's interest."'04 This comment was made in the
course of a discussion of the insurer's potential double liability for
policy loans, wherein the court suggested that granting such a
loan after actual notice would be inconsistent with the Govern-
ment's interests. In accord with these dicta, a revenue ruling ad-
vises insurance companies that upon actual notice of a tax lien,
they should defer cash payment of surrender value or policy loans
to the insured and notify the Government of such demands. 0
This affords the Government effective protection against leakage
arising from the payment of sums of cash to the insured which
represent most or all of the interest of the policyholder in his
insurance policy - probably the most serious threat to the Gov-
ernment's collectible interest in the lien.
This result is not inconsistent with the analysis contained in
this Note. Rejection of levy as a collection device is founded on
the view that the insurer possesses no "property" of the insured.'00
A lien too, can attach only to "property and rights to property.' 0
However, the argument that cash value in the hands of the issuer
is not the "property" of the insured becomes unavailable once the
insured demands cash value or a policy loan. At that point the
nature of the contract is changed. It is no longer an agreement
providing for alternative performances, but one under which a
current debt in the amount of the demand is due and payable.
It can then be said without dispute that the insurer holds property
of the insured in the form of an unconditional debt. Because the
obligation is unconditional the doctrines of tortious impairment of
a lien and garnishment are applicable to force the insurer to pro-
tect the Government's interest. The insurer's obligation has be-
come conceptually identical to a bank deposit. 08
Considerations of public policy also support imposition of a
limited burden on insurers with respect to demands for cash value
104. 333 F.2d at 114.
105. Rev. Rul. 48, 1956-1 CUM. BuLL. 561; see notes 88-91 supra and
accompanying text.
106. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
107. INT. REV. CODE OF 19543 § 6321.
108. See notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text.
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and policy loans after receipt of actual notice. The insurer has the
means available to protect itself in this situation. Under the terms
of the typical policy, it may defer the payment of cash value or
the extension of a policy loan for a stipulated period of time (us-
ually six months) after it is requested. 09 Moreover, it is authori-
tatively reported that insurers are "generally ... willing to com-
municate with the proper officials before making any payment to
delinquent taxpayers ... and to withhold payment if advised to
do so.""x0 Nevertheless, it is also true that most of the demands
for policy loans or cash value are of an emergency nature. There-
fore, it is not surprising that many companies take pride in fur-
nishing twenty-four hour service."' Deferments of payment pend-
ing consultation with tax authorities would no doubt result in the
loss of some good will. However, it should be noted that similar
interference with banks' ordinary services does not prevent the
imposition of a burden on them to act consistently with known
tax liens.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Government is clearly
correct in insisting that a duty to act consistently with a lien
ought to be imposed on insurance companies when demand for
payment is made on them after receipt of actual notice of the lien.
This need not be an absolute duty. The company should notify
the Government of the demand by the delinquent taxpayer, stat-
ing the period for which it may delay payment under its contract.
The burden would then be on the Government to take effective
action to enforce its rights, such as moving to collect, during this
period. If the Government fails to act, the company should be
able to honor its insured's demand without risking double liability.
b. Extension of Automatic Premium Loans and Other Non-
forfeiture Benefits After Receipt of Actual Notice
Unlike its position when called upon to pay cash value or ex-
tend policy loans, the insurer cannot protect the tax lien from
diminution by operation of the various nonforfeiture benefits con-
tained in a typical insurance policy without violating its con-
tract.112 Thus, it has been held and the Government has reluc-
109. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 105 n.13 (3d Cir.
1964); McGmLL app. B.
110. Walker, Life Insurance and the Federal Tax Lien, 15 J. Am. Soc'v
C.L.U. 831, 341 (1961). At the time of publication Mr. Walker was Assistant
Counsel of the Life Insurance Association of America.
111. See United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 113 (3d Cir. 1964).
112. See id. at 105 n.13; McGnL 309-23. The insurer may ordinarily defer
payment of cash value or the making of a policy loan for a period of time
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tantly conceded that even after receipt of notice of a tax lien,
the insurer may make automatic premium loans or apply cash
value to purchase extended term insurance without risking lia-
bility to the Government for the resulting diminution in cash
value.x"a
Apart from the difference in the contractual obligation of the
insurer, the application of cash value to nonforfeiture benefits is
probably less prejudicial to the Government than is distribution
of cash value in the form of outright payment or extension of
policy loans. Should the insured elect to have cash value applied
to the purchase of paid-up life insurance, the Government will
not be prejudiced since the new policy will have cash value
approximately equal to that of the original."' On the other hand,
automatic premium loans may diminish the amount of cash value
available on surrender"' and the election of extended term in-
surance will certainly do so as time passes."16 However, even the
latter two are likely to be less prejudicial to the Government than
a distribution to the insured of surrender value or a policy loan.
In the case of nonforfeiture benefits, the cash value is applied
gradually within the company and, when used to fund automatic
premium loans, may even experience a net increase;" 7 while in
the case of a payment as surrender value or policy loan, cash
value is distributed to the delinquent and may well be imme-
diately squandered and forever lost to the Government.
The distinction between payments and loans on the one hand,
and application to nonforfeiture benefits on the other, is consistent
specified in the terms of the policy. See authorities cited note 109 supra.
Obviously, no such deferment is possible when cash value must be immediately
applied to the appropriate nonforfeiture benefit upon a default of premium
payment to maintain the insurance protection in force.
118. United States v. Sullivan, supra note 111, at 114; United States v.
Wilson, 333 F.2d 187, 143 (3d Cir. 1964).
114. See McGnL 312-14.
115. The effect of applying cash value to the payment of premiums under
the automatic loan provision depends on the maturity of the policy. If it is at
least several years old, there may be a net increase in cash value (i.e., an in-
crease in cash surrender value) for a period of time. Of course, since cash
value will increase at a rate less than the increases in the loan account,
continuous use by the insured of the premium loan provision will eventually
operate to diminish and perhaps finally extinguish cash surrender value. See
note 18, srupra.
116. See United States v. Birrell, 233 F. Supp. 921, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
McGirs 314-19.
117. The courts have recognized this possibility although thus far no
determination of its legal significance has been made. See United States v.
Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 109 n.18 (3d Cir. 1964); United States v. Wilson, 333
F.2d 187, 143 (3d Cir. 1964); note 18 supra.
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with the analysis contained in this Note. It has been shown that
receipt of actual notice binds the insurer to protect the Govern-
ment's tax lien after its conditional bundle of obligations has
become an unconditional debt payable as cash value on surrender
or as a policy loan. However, upon default in payment of pre-
miums one of the nonforfeiture benefits becomes automatically
binding on the insurer. Although it now owes an unconditional
debt in the sense that it must apply cash value, this obligation
is distinguishable from the debt arising upon an election to receive
surrender value or a policy loan because the policy directs that it
be applied to a particular purpose other than distribution to the
policyholder. In this very real sense the debt is still a conditional
obligation.118
IV. PROPOSED GOVERNMENTAL REMEDIES
A. LumlTm AVAILAB TY OF LEYY ON CASH VALUE
This Note has suggested that a limited burden be placed on
insurers with actual notice of a tax lien to notify the Government
of any demand for cash value or a policy loan by the delinquent
taxpayer and to defer payment during the period permitted by
the insurance contract if that is desired by the Government. The
burden would then be on the Government to enforce its rights
during this period. It is now proposed that the Government be
permitted to levy upon the amount demanded to facilitate its
collection during this period. No authority relating to the pro-
priety of this suggestion has been discovered. However, levy
would afford the Government the means to act quickly during
this limited period to prevent leakage of cash value from under
its lien. It would make possible a saving of time for all parties,
and, in addition, avoid expensive court action to foreclose the lien.
By reducing the time necessary to obtain collection, the levy would
also minimize any risk that the insurer would become ensnarled
in a conflict between its obligations to the insured and to the
Government.
118. In United States v. Sullivan, supra note 117, at 114, the court stated
that "the lien on any debts brought about by the functioning of the automatic
premium loan clauses is subject to those provisions' further operational re-
quirement that such amounts be applied to premium payment." This means
that while the unconditional obligation of the insurer upon default may be
regarded as a debt, it is an unusual debt in that it is not payable to the
insured as a sum of money, but may be satisfied only by the application of
cash value to pay a premium-a paper transaction consummated wholly
within the insurance company. Accord, United States v. Mitchell, 210 F. Supp.
810, 815 (S.D. Ala. 1962).
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Moreover, the policy objection to the general availability of
levy against cash value does not appear to apply in this situation.
Once the insured has made an election to receive payment of all
or part of his cash value, levy upon that amount will not prejudice
the insured or the beneficiaries. Any impairment of their insur-
ance protection which occurs would have resulted from the in-
sured's decision, whether or not the Government intervened. Nor
is the theoretical argument that levy against cash value is unavail-
able because cash value in the hands of the insurer is not "prop-
erty" of the insured applicable to this situation. After election by
the insured to receive cash value, the insurer owes an uncondi-
tional obligation which may properly be viewed as the insured's
"fund" or property, to which a lien may attach and against which
levy ought to lie.
B. LEVY ON THE INSURED'S BUNDiLE OF RIGHTS"
In attempting to realize the cash surrender value of defaulting
taxpayers' insurance policies, the Government has consistently
taken the position that such value constitutes a liquidated, un-
conditional debt similar to a bank deposit. If that view were ac-
cepted, levy upon cash value would be permitted without benefit
of the distraint sale otherwise required by statute." 9 The courts,
however, have refused to treat cash value as the equivalent of
cash.'20 It is nevertheless arguable that the Government ought
to be permitted to levy upon the entire "bundle of rights" owned
by the insured in the policy, represented by the contractual ob-
ligations of the insurer. Since this bundle is clearly not cash, a
distraint sale would have to be held after the seizure at which the
insured's entire interest in the policy would be sold.
At the distraint sale the Government would establish a mini-
mum bid 21 equal to the cash surrender value of the policy. Re-
ceipt of this bid would fully satisfy the Government's interest in
the policy. If the minimum were not met, the policy would be-
come the property of the United States.122 As owner rather than
lienor the Government could then demand and obtain cash value
from the insurer. If this procedure were followed many of the
considerations underlying the preference of the courts for judicial
119. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 6335.
120. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 71, 74 (9th Cir.
1965); United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 116-21 (3d Cir. 1964); Equi-
table Life Assur. Soc'y v. United States, 331 F.2d 29, 85-38 (1st Cir. 1964).
121. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6335(e)(1).
122. Ibid.
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foreclosure as opposed to levy as a means of reaching cash value
would be inapplicable. During the period between levy and sale,
the operation of the policy would remain unaffected and the
insured would be free to redeem."' At sale all interested parties
(probably restricted to beneficiaries or others with an insurable
interest) would have an opportunity to purchase the policy to
protect their interest in the insurance feature of the policy.' 4 The
principal advantage for the Government, of course, would be to
reduce drastically the period of time following attachment of lien
during which leakage could occur.12 5
Unfortunately the Government has not sought to avail itself
of this procedure. However, in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United
States,126 the Ninth Circuit recently refused to permit a levy
upon cash value solely on the ground that the Government had
erroneously regarded cash value as the equivalent of cash and
consequently had not subjected the insured's rights to a distraint
sale after their seizure.'27 The court expressly left open the ques-
tion whether levy might be made upon such rights." Moreover,
this use of levy appears supported by a reading of the Bess case
and the levy statute. In the former it was held that a tax lien at-
taches to an insured's right to cash value.'29 The latter provides
that levy shall be available against all property or rights to prop-
erty to which a lien attaches. 30 Consequently it would seem
that levy ought to be available to reach cash value as a bundle
of rights even though it is not available against cash value as the
equivalent of cash.
123. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6337(a).
124. Of. Industrial Loan & Inv. Co. v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 222
Mo. App. 1228, 3 S.W.2d 1046 (1928); Reusner v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 47
Mo. App. 836 (1891); see Pyle, supra note 82, at 228-29.
125. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6335(d) provides that the destraint sale
shall take place not less than 10 nor more than 40 days from the giving of
public notice of the sale.
126. 343 F.2d 71 (1965), modifying United States v. Salerno, 222 F. Supp.
664 (D. Nev. 1963).
127. Id. at 74. The Salerno case, note 126 supra, until modified, was the
sole authority opposed to Sullivan and Equitable Life. In that case levy was
held to be a meaningful demand upon the insurer which fixed the minimum
amount of cash value subject to the tax lien. A penalty under INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 6332(b) was imposed upon the insurer for leakage due to the appli-
cation of automatic premium loans subsequent to the levy and demand. On
appeal the Mutual Life court refused to hold the insurer liable for such
leakage.
128. See note 55 supra.
129. 357 U.S. at 55-57.
130. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6331 (a).
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It is sufficient to indicate that apparently no conceptual or
practical objection exists to making available to the Government
the remedy of summary levy on cash value in the hands of the
insurer, so long as it is regarded as an integral part of the insured's
bundle of rights held by the insurer rather than as a liquidated
debt.
C. LEVY ON THE POLICY
There is no direct judicial authority supporting the proposal
advanced above for levy upon the insured's bundle of rights in
the hands of the insurer. However there is another, related means
by which the Government might protect itself against diminution
in the value of its liens through the operation of nonforfeiture
benefits prior to the completion of foreclosure actions. This is
direct levy on the policy in the hands of the insured, which ap-
parently is available' and is sufficiently expeditious to afford
the Government substantial protection. Levy on the policy is
also consistent with existing legal doctrine. It has always been
conceded that the lien attached to the rights of the insured in
his policy because they are "property or rights to property."
Therefore, seizure by levy ought to be available against the physi-
cal document embodying these property rights. After levy, the
Government would have to subject the policy to a distraint sale
which would afford substantial protection for the interests of the
insured and the beneficiaries. 32
Although levy on the policy would provide summary relief
against the operation of nonforfeiture benefits, the Government
evidently has neglected the device. This is perhaps explained by
its unworkability in certain situations. For example, it is unavail-
able if the policy cannot be located, as when the taxpayer has
absconded and taken it with him."s'
131. Kyle v. McGuirk, 82 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1936). The Kyle case was
noted by the three 1942 cases which held that levy against cash value in the
hands of the insurer was not possible: United States v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 130 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir.); United States v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 130
F.2d 495 (3d Cir.); United States v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 127
F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir.). These cases indicated that Kyle was correct in de-
ciding that the taxpayer's right to cash surrender value could be seized and
sold at a distraint sale and the proceeds would be applied to reduce his tax
liability. Further, in Sullivan, 333 F.2d at 119, the court assumes that levy on
the policy in the insured's possession is completely acceptable as a means of
summary collection of the insured's interest in his life insurance.
132. See notes 191-25 supra and accompanying text.
133. In United States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 17 (4th Cir.
1958), and Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y. v. United States, 331 F.2d 29 (1st Cir.
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D. JuicrA EQUITY
The Sullivan court refused to impose upon the insurer the risk
of diminution in cash value through the operation of the auto-
matic premium loan provisions after the commencement of judi-
cial foreclosure proceedings' 3 However, it went out of its way to
suggest that after commencement of suit, the Government "could
have properly availed itself of the court's [equity] processes ...
to take effective steps against the insurers before the time when
the automatic premium loan provisions ... became operative."35
The Government does not appear ever to have availed itself of
this protection, and no case has been found which directly con-
siders its right to do so. Prompt exercise of such a power could
preclude or at least mitigate operation of policy provisions detri-
mental to the Government's interest. This would afford the Gov-
ernment effective protection against leakage by operation of the
nonforfeiture benefits and other policy provisions. A court might,
for example, enjoin all operation of the policy including the auto-
matic premium loan provision and other nonforfeiture benefits.
Short of this, it could order the insurer to limit charges against
cash value to a minimum until the hearing commences. For in-
stance, the court might order the insurer not to effect an auto-
matic premium loan for a full year's premium but only for lesser
periods until the hearing. Finally, the foreclosure action could be
moved ahead on the trial calendar to minimize the exposure of
the Government's lien to risk of leakage.
CONCLUSION
It is well-settled that a federal tax lien attaches to the delin-
quent-taxpayer-insured's right to the cash value of his life insur-
ance. However, the Government has developed no effective
method for reaching this asset quickly or preventing leakage
from the collectible value of its lien prior to a judicial foreclosure
action. The courts have not permitted the Government to treat
cash value as the equivalent of cash and employ the summary
collection device of levy against cash value without holding a
distraint sale. This result is doubtless sound. It would be an
injustice to the insured and the beneficiaries to allow the Gov-
ernment summarily to terminate all interests in an insurance
1964), the taxpayer-insureds had fled the country, forcing the Government to
foreclose its tax lien in district court following the assertion of in rem jurisdic-
tion over the policy by published service.
134. United States v. Sullivan, 333 Red 100, 120 (3d Cir. 1964).
135. Id. at 120-21.
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policy without affording these parties an opportunity to protect
such interests.
As a result, however, the Government has usually been forced
to fall back upon judicial foreclosure as the means to realize upon
its liens on rights to cash surrender value. This method is slow,
cumbersome, and expensive. The time consumed in pursuing it
affords considerable opportunity for leakage of cash value from
under the lien as a consequence of elections by the insured and
the operation of various nonforfeiture benefits. Therefore the
Government has sought to hold insurers responsible for leakage
which they have permitted after receiving actual notice of the
existence of liens. It has met with varying degrees of success de-
pending upon the policy provision in question. For example, the
insurer may make automatic premium loans or effectuate extend-
ed term insurance at any time prior to actual foreclosure without
risking liability to the Government. However, it would appear
that if the insurer extends policy loans or pays cash surrender
value it will be subjected to liability to the Government for
diminution of the tax lien. This distinction between nonforfeiture
benefits and cash value payments or policy loans is based on the
impact of the operation of the provisions upon the interests of
the insured and the beneficiaries. Since interruption of the nonfor-
feiture benefits would prejudice the rights of the insured and of
the beneficiaries, such provisions continue to be operative until
foreclosure. However, no prejudice to the insured or the bene-
ficiaries will result from requiring the insurer to pay to the Gov-
ernment rather than the insured any actual disbursements elected
by the insured. Since the insured has elected to terminate or re-
duce his interest in his insurance, it is only fair to require that
any actual payments be made to the Government to reduce his
tax delinquency.
This Note suggests four possible methods by which the Gov-
ernment may prevent or mitigate the effects of leakage.
First, it might levy upon cash value in the hands of the insurer
after an election by the insured to take a policy loan or receive
cash surrender value. Such a procedure would enable the Gov-
ernment to reach the distribution quickly and inexpensively and
without requiring the insurer to breach its policy obligations.
Second, the Government might levy against the insurer on the
entire "bundle of rights" owned by the insured, which necessarily
includes cash value as an integral part. Such a procedure will
protect the interests of the beneficiaries through the distraint sale
1050
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required by statute. The insured, in addition to his right to bid
at such a sale, would also have a right to redeem the entire "bun-
dle" prior to sale.
Third, the Government might levy on the physical policy in
the hands of the insured, an approach related to the second pro-
posal. This idea has found some judicial support and involves
seizure and sale of the document which represents the "bundle
of rights" owned by the insured. While levy on the policy would
have the same net effect as levy upon the "bundle of rights" in
the hands of the insurer, it may be somewhat preferable because
the protection afforded the insured might be greater.
Fourth, the equity powers of the courts are probably available
to the Government to mitigate the effects of leakage if the Gov-
ernment acts with diligence to foreclose its lien.
